

Message Text

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R 171730Z AUG 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 181101

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO, CSCE

SUBJECT: CSCE: POLADS DISCUSSION OF CBMS: UK PAPER

REFS: A) USNATO 4356, B) USNATO 4396, C) GENEVA 4813

1. AT AUGUST 20 POLADS YOU SHOULD THANK UK FOR FACILITATING
DISCUSSION BY TABLING PAPER ON CBMS, STATE US EXPECTATION
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THAT PAPER CAN SERVE AS BASIS FOR REPORT BY POLADS TO

NAC FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 5 CONSULTATIONS WITH EXPERTS, AND
PROPOSE TEXTUAL CHANGES IN UK
DRAFT SUGGESTED BELOW IN
ORDER
TO FOCUS THE DEBATE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. YOU SHOULD INDICATE
THAT WE DO NOT SHARE THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN THE LAST SENTENCE
OF THE UK PAPER THAT THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING THE NATO
POSITION
IS TOO DELICATE TO COMMIT TO WRITING. YOU SHOULD
EMPHASIZE THAT THE CURRENT NATO EXERCISE IS AIMED AT
REACHING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON ESSENTIALS INCLUDING
PARAMETERS FOR CBMS. THE VAGUENESS OF THE UK PAPER DOES NOT
PERMIT ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE. CONSEQUENTLY,
WE REQUEST
THAT POLADS REPORT TO NAC REFLECT US VIEWS ON SPECIFIC
POINTS EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES APPROPRIATE FOOTNOTES OR
BRACKETS.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO FIRST AND THIRD SECTIONS OF UK
PAPER--"GENERAL OBJECTIVES" AND "GUIDELINES"--WITH
EXCEPTION OF FINAL SENTENCE OF PAPER MENTIONED ABOVE. WE
WOULD, HOWEVER, PROPOSE TO EXTENSIVELY REWRITE THE SECTION

ON "SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES" TO MAKE IT TRULY SPECIFIC AND,
IN ADDITION, TO ATTACH AS AN ANNEX SPECIFIC TEXTUAL
LANGUAGE FOR DEALING WITH THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF MANEUVERS.
TO BOLSTER ARGUMENT FOR GREATER SPECIFICITY, YOU MIGHT
POINT OUT THAT UK DRAFT FAILS TO ADDRESS A NUMBER OF
TOPICS ON WHICH NATO GENEVA CAUCUS REQUESTED GUIDANCE ON
JULY 25, AS REPORTED REFTEL C.

3. FOLLOWING IS US PROPOSAL FOR REDRAFT OF "SPECIFIC
OBJECTIVES" SECTION OF UK PAPER:

BEGIN TEXT:

"(2) WE WANT AN AGREEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF
MANEUVERS WHICH WOULD IN PRACTICE INVOLVE ALL PARTICIPANTS
IN NOTIFYING TO ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTICIPANTS THE
POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
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MANEUVERS WHICH
TAKE PLACE IN THE RELEVANT AREA. AN AREA ENCOMPASSING ALL
OF EUROPE BUT LIMITED IN THE USSR TO A BAND OF 500-700 KM
(AND EXCLUDING THE MEDITERRANEAN) WOULD BE MOST LIKELY
OF ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTICIPANTS, BUT MUST BE FORMULATED
WITH SPECIAL CONCERN FOR THE NEEDS OF THE NATO FLANK
STATES. AN ANNOUNCEMENT TIME OF 30 DAYS AND A THRESHOLD
IN THE 20,000-MAN RANGE WOULD ALSO BE REALISTIC. THERE

SHOULD BE NO COMMITMENT TO NOTIFY SEPARATE AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS.

"(3) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS, THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENT SHOULD STATE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS HAS BEEN CAREFULLY STUDIED BUT SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE OR IN ANY WAY INDICATE THAT MEASURES ON THIS SUBJECT ARE PRACTICABLE AT THIS TIME. THERE SHOULD BE NO COMMITMENT TO STUDY THE SUBJECT FURTHER AFTER THE CONFERENCE.

"(4) THE TEXT ON EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS WHICH WAS AGREED IN GENEVA ON JULY 25 PROVIDES A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRACTICES AND MODALITIES OF EXCHANGES. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THESE PRACTICES AND MODALITIES DEVELOP IN A WAY FAVORABLE TO ALL, NATO SHOULD UNDERTAKE AN INTERNAL STUDY TO DETERMINE THE FACILITIES AND CONDITIONS NATO MEMBERS SHOULD PROVIDE AND EXPECT.

"(5) THE ALREADY-AGREED TEXT ON MILITARY VISIT EXCHANGES SEAMS TO BE THE ONLY ADDITIONAL CBM LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WARSAW PACT, AND THE ALLIANCE HAS NO STRONG INTEREST IN PRESSING ANY OF THE NEUTRAL PROPOSALS STILL ON THE TABLE." END TEXT.

4. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC TEXTUAL SUGGESTIONS FOR TREATMENT OF MANEUVERS CBM, WHICH SHOULD BE ANNEXED TO THE ABOVE PAPER WHEN IT IS FORWARDED TO THE NAC. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THESE ARE BASED ON LANGUAGE ALREADY PARTIALLY AGREED IN GENEVA AND ON WELL-DISCUSSED POSITIONS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. WE BELIEVE TEXTS REPRESENT REALISTIC COMPROMISES WHICH SATISFY BASIC ALLIED INTERESTS AND STAND CONFIDENTIAL

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A REASONABLE CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTABLE TO NEUTRALS AND WARSAW PACT.

BEGIN TEXT.

SIZE AND DEFINITION.

IN THIS CONTEXT THE RELEVANT MILITARY MANEUVERS ARE THOSE INVOLVING TROOPS, TOGETHER WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS, IN WHICH ANY PARTICIPATING STATE IS ENGAGED.

IN THE SAME CONTEXT THE TERM "MAJOR" MEANS 20,000 TROOPS OR MORE.

AREA.

NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS (NATURE OF COMMITMENT) GIVEN THAT TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE TERRITORY, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND AIR SPACE, OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATES IN EUROPE. IN THE CASE OF THOSE PARTICIPATING STATES WHOSE CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY EXTENDS BEYOND EUROPE, NOTIFICATION (NATURE OF COMMITMENT) BE GIVEN ONLY TO MANEUVERS ANY PART OF WHICH TAKE PLACE WITHIN 700 KILOMETERS OF THEIR BORDER WITH ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, OR WITHIN 700 KILOMETERS OF THEIR EUROPEAN COASTLINE.

PARTIES NOTIFIED.

THEY (NATURE OF COMMITMENT) NOTIFY ALL OTHER STATES WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE CSCE OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS ON A BILATERAL BASIS THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

TIME OF NOTIFICATION.

NOTIFICATION (NATURE OF COMMITMENT) BE GIVEN 30 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE MANEUVER, OR, IN THE CASE OF A MANEUVER ARRANGED AT SHORTER NOTICE, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO ITS BEGINNING DATE.
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CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

NOTIFICATION (NATURE OF COMMITMENT) CONTAIN INFORMATION ON THE DESIGNATION, IF ANY, NATURE AND GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MANEUVERS, THE TYPE AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES ENGAGED, THE ESTIMATED TIME FRAME OF ITS CONDUCT INCLUDING THE APPROXIMATE DATES OF THE BEGINNING AND ENDING OF THE MANEUVER, THE AREA INVOLVED, AND, IF APPROPRIATE, ANY OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION.

SMALLER MANEUVERS.

WITH THE AIM OF INCREASING CONFIDENCE FURTHER, AND WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES MAY ALSO NOTIFY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES NEAR THE AREA OF ACTIVITY OF SMALLER SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS.

5. COMMENT. OUR REDRAFT OF PARA 4 OF THE UK DRAFT IS MEANT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FRG REQUEST (PARA 4 REFTTEL B) FOR "COMMON NATO INTERPRETATION" OF AGREED TEXT ON EXCHANGE OF

OBSERVERS. INTERPRETED AS WE HAVE DONE, IT GIVES US NO PROBLEM, AND IN FACT SEEMS USEFUL. HOWEVER, IF FRG REP MEANT TO SUGGEST REOPENING OF NEGOTIATION OF THIS SUBJECT IN CSCE, WE COULD NOT AGREE, SINCE THIS WOULD BE VIEWED BY EAST AS STALLING TACTIC AND COULD LEAD TO ENDLESS WRANGLING OVER MINOR DETAILS.

6. WE SHARE SKEPTICISM EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS AT AUGUST 13 POLADS ON BRITISH SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLE CBM WORK IN A CSCE FOLLOW-UP PHASE. IT WOULD BE HIGHLY PREFERABLE FOR ALLIES TO DECIDE NOW WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE ACCEPTABLE AND NEGOTIABLE CBM TEXT AND WORK IN STAGE II TO REALIZE THAT OBJECTIVE. DELAYING RESOLUTION OF ISSUE UNTIL FOLLOW-UP PHASE WOULD ONLY PLAY INTO HANDS OF THOSE WHO WANT TO EMPHASIZE POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF THAT PHASE. FURTHERMORE, WE AGREE WITH FRENCH THAT APPEARING TO DUCK ISSUES IN CBMS WOULD CREATE BAD PRECEDENT FOR OTHER AREAS OF CSCE.
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7. PARAGRAPH ON AREA HAS BEEN DRAFTED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF FLANK ALLIES, AND TO AVOID SINGLING OUT THE SOVIET UNION AS THE ONLY EXCEPTION, WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO DEVELOP ALLIED POSITION ON ISSUE OF AREA OF NOTIFICATION FOR NATO FLANKS IN SPC.
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